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PUNISHING VICTIM AS PERPETRATOR: IN RE: S.K. AND 
THE CHILLING EFFECT OF LABELING TEEN SEXTING AS 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
BY EMMA KAUFMAN* 
1In their 2019 decision, In re S.K. , the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals addressed two issues: whether it is possible to convict a minor for 
the distribution of child pornography, and whether it is possible to con-
vict a minor for the display of obscene material when the minor is a 
2consensual party participating in the documented sexual activity.  On 
the distribution issue, the Court held that there was no exception for 
minors within the Maryland child pornography criminal statute, and 
therefore, minors can be adjudicated as delinquent as distributors of 
3child pornography.  As for the obscene materials issue, the Court held 
that cellphone videos qualified as one of the “items” enumerated by the 
Maryland child pornography statute and S.K.’s conduct fell within the 
4purview of the statute, thus violating its provisions.  
However, the Court’s decision was incorrect in three major ca-
pacities: the holding failed to advance the legislative intent underlying 
5the child pornography statute  the decision takes too broad a view in 
characterizing a text message video as one of the “items” enumerated 
6by the applicable statute , and the decision neglected to use a constitu-
tional analysis to reconcile the technological realities of voluntary sex-
7 8ting  with the antiquated child pornography statute.  
Part I of this article will outline the circumstances that resulted 
in criminal charges being filed against S.K., and the decisions of the trial 
9and appellate courts thereafter.  Part II will discuss the case’s legal his-
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1 461 Md. 31 (2019). 
2 Id. at 36. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5  See infra Part IV-A. 
6  See infra Part IV-B. 
7 See infra Part IV-C; see also Sexting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crea-
tion, possession, or distribution of sexually explicit images via cellphones”). 
8 See infra Part IV-C. 
9 See infra Part I. 
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tory, including foundational Supreme Court cases addressing child por-
nography, the legislative effort to combat child pornography at the na-
tional and state level, research on sexting among minors, and the at-
tempts of various states to reconcile consensual sexting among minors 
10with child pornography legislation.  Part III will explore the Court of 
Appeals ’reasoning in deciding S.K.’s case, ultimately leading the Court 
to adjudicate S.K. as delinquent for her involvement in the distribution 
of child pornography, as well as in the display of an obscene item to a 
11minor.  Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision in In re S.K., examining 
the Court’s adherence to the legislative intent behind the child pornog-
raphy statute, as well as the Court’s characterization of a texted video 
as a “film”, concluding with a discussion of the implications of catego-
12rizing consensual sexting among minors as child pornography.  
I. THE CASE 
From 2016 to 2017, a trio of friends attending Maurice J. 
McDonough High School in Charles County, Maryland, used their cell-
13phones to send each other photos and videos in a group chat.  The 
friend group was comprised of A.T., a sixteen-year-old female, K.S., a 
14seventeen-year-old male, and S.K., a sixteen-year-old female.  The 
group chat communications were occasionally used as a sort of “one-
up” competition, where the videos and photos sent by one friend were 
15intended to impress or shock the other friends in some way.  In accord-
ance with the group chat dynamic, S.K. sent K.S. and A.T. a one-minute 
16video in which S.K performed fellatio on an unidentified male.  The 
male appeared to be filming the video with his arm extended, during 
which the male’s upper torso and erect penis were visible, and S.K.’s 
17nude upper body and breast were exposed.   Unfortunately, there was a 
conflict between S.K. and K.S. in December of 2016, after which K.S. 
persuaded A.T. to accompany him in reporting S.K.’s video to the 
school resources officer, a uniformed police officer assigned to the 
18school.  A.T. later testified that during this time period, K.S. bragged 
                                                
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 36 (2019). 
14 Id. 
15 See id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 37. 
18 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 37. 
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to his peers that he would be able to send S.K. to jail if he showed the 
19texted video to the school administration.  
A.T. and K.S. brought the video to the attention of the school 
resource officer, Mr. Eugene Caballero, an of the Charles County Sher-
iff’ 20s Office.  Following the meeting, Officer Caballero met with S.K., 
who provided the officer with a written statement declaring that she was 
21in the video and she had only sent it to K.S. and A.T.  According to the 
officer’s police report, S.K. agreed to speak with Officer Caballero after 
22she was read her Miranda rights.  Additionally, S.K. believed that the 
purpose of the meeting was to stop the video being from being distrib-
uted further at the school and was not informed that she was suspected 
23of criminal activity.  Officer Caballero submitted his report to the 
State’s Attorney for Charles County, which used its discretion to file 
24criminal charges against S.K. on three counts.  Count 1 charged S.K. 
25with violating CR § 11-207(a)(2)  for filming a minor engaged in sex-
26ual conduct, Count 2 charged S.K. with violating CR § 11-207(a)(4)  
for distributing child pornography, and Count 3 charged S.K. with vio-
27lating CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii)  for displaying obscene materials to a mi-
28nor.  
At the April 27, 2017, adjudicatory hearing before the Circuit 
Court of Charles County, the juvenile court dismissed Count 1, finding 
that there was no evidence to support the contention that S.K. filmed the 
29video at issue.  The court held that S.K. was involved regarding Counts 
2 and 3, and subsequently placed S.K. on electronic monitoring and su-
30pervised probation between May 18, 2017, and June 9, 2017.  During 
                                                
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 38. 
22 Id. 
23 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207(a)(2) (2019) (“A person may not . . . photograph 
or film a minor engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct”). 
26 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207(a)(4) (2019) (“A person 
may not . . . knowingly promote, advertise, solicit, distribute, or possess with the intent to dis-
tribute any matter, visual representation, or performance. . . .”). 
27 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-203(b)(1)(ii) (2019) (“A person 
may not willfully or knowingly display or exhibit to a minor an item . . . that consists of an 
obscene picture of a nude or partially nude figure”). 
28 In re S.K. 466 Md. at 38. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 38–39. 
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this period, S.K. was required to report to a Department of Juvenile Ser-
vices probation officer, obtain permission prior to moving or leaving 
Maryland, allow the probation officer to enter her home, complete a 
weekly drug test, attend and complete an anger management course, and 
31complete a substance abuse assessment.  After S.K. completed her pro-
bation requirements on September 27, 2018, and her case was ordered 
closed and sealed, S.K. appealed the juvenile court’s delinquency find-
32ing to the Court of Special Appeals.  
On Count 1, the Court of Special Appeals held that Maryland’s 
child pornography statute, CR § 11-207, does not exempt minors from 
33its purview, and therefore, S.K. was in violation of the statute.  On 
Count 2, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and held that 
the video that S.K. sent to K.S. and A.T. did not qualify as an “item” as 
34enumerated by CR § 11-203 , and therefore, S.K. was not involved as 
35to the second criminal charge.  Following the Court of Special Appeals 
decision, both the state and S.K. filed petitions for writs of certiorari 
with the Court of Appeals, which the Court granted on October 9, 
362018.  The Court agreed with the intermediate appellate court’s analy-
sis of the first criminal charge, but the Court disagreed with the inter-
mediate court on the second charge, and found that the video S.K. texted 
to K.S. and A.T. fell within CR § 11-203’s definition of “item”—spe-
cifically, the video qualified as a “film,” one of the types of media enu-
37merated by the statute.  As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
Court of Special Appeals, finding that S.K. was involved as to both 
38criminal charges.  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act in 1978 in response to increasing concerns among Amer-
ican citizens and their elected representatives about the exploitation of 
                                                
31 Id. at 39. 
32 Id. 
33 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 39–40 (citing In re S.K., 237 Md. App. 458, 473 (2018)). 
34 In re S.K., 466 Md. at 40; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-203(a)(4)(2006) (“Sale or 
display of obscene item to minor . . . (4)’Item ’means a: (i) still picture or photograph; (ii) book, 
pocket book, pamphlet or magazine; (iii) videodisc, videotape, video game, film, or computer 
disc; or (iv) recorded telephone message”). 
35 In re S.K. 466 Md. at 40. 
36 Id. at 41. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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minors in the production and distribution of child pornography as well 
as through child prostitution.39 The main goal of the legislation was to 
prevent the recruitment of vulnerable children for the purposes of child 
40pornography and prostitution.  The Senate report accompanying the act 
stated that the children recruited were “frequently [the] victims of child 
abuse, or of broken homes, or of parents who simply do not care,” and 
that the exploitation of the children resulted in a “deep psychological, 
humiliating impact” on the children, and thus jeopardizing “the possi-
41bility of healthy, affectionate relationships in the future.”  However, 
cultural shifts regarding sexuality, the explosion of constant cellphone 
use, as well as the manner in which those seismic societal changes have 
impacted communication, complicate the act’ 42s original mandate.  As a 
result, courts across the country are now deciding whether to adjudicate 
minors for voluntarily sending explicit images of themselves under the 
applicable child pornography statute, if that statute contains no excep-
43tion for minors.  
Part II.A of this note traces the foundational cases that created 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing child pornography.44 Part 
II.B tracks the evolution of child pornography legislation at the national 
level.45 Part II.C provides an overview of the development of Mary-
land’s laws related to child pornography.46 Part II.D delves into the in-
creasingly common practice of sexting among minors.47 Finally, Part 
II.E outlines several states ’approaches to the issue of combating child 
pornography in a world where teen sexting is common and where Mar-
yland stands in relation to those approaches.48 
A. Understanding Child Pornography: Foundational Case Law 
Modern understandings of what legally qualifies as “obscene” 
49can be traced back to the 1973 case Miller v. California , where the 
                                                
39 See S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3–4 (1977). 
40 See id. at 8–11. 
41 Id. 
42 See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 
15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 506–07 (2008). 
43 See id. at 514–15. 
44 See infra Part II-A. 
45 See infra Part II-B. 
46 See infra Part II-C. 
47 See infra Part II-D. 
48 See infra Part II-E. 
49 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Supreme Court provided a new test under which the producers of certain 
50materials would be criminalized for violating federal obscenity laws.  
The Court declared that materials would be declared obscene if those 
materials “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as 
a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
51value.”  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger referenced the 
purpose of the First Amendment in his opinion, stating that the amend-
ment protected speech and press that were aimed at furthering the ex-
52change of ideas that facilitated valuable political and social shifts.  
These shifts were desired by the American people, and, unlike explicit 
sexual images, would advance the nation towards a more enlightened 
53future.  
54In the 1982 case New York v. Ferber , the Supreme Court ex-
panded its Miller framework to criminalize child pornography, declar-
ing that child pornography was included within the umbrella concept of 
“ 55obscene material,” but that a different test must be used.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice White stated that the Miller test required adjust-
ment for determining whether obscene materials qualified as child por-
56nography.  The Ferber Court held that the “trier of fact need not find 
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it 
is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently 
offensive manner, and the material at issue need not be considered as a 
57whole.”  In defining child pornography, the Court stated that prohibited 
depictions included materials featuring minors engaged in “actual or 
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestial-
ity, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the 
58genitals.”  The Court concluded that child pornography was a suffi-
ciently distinct category of obscene material that was not afforded First 
59Amendment protections.  Additionally, the State’s interest in safe-
guarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors is “com-
pelling,” and thus, states must be given greater deference in how they 
                                                
50 Id. at 36–37. 
51 Id. at 24. 
52 Id. at 16, 34–35. 
53 Id. at 34–35. 
54 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
55 Id. at 764. 
56 Id. at 749, 764. 
57 Id. at 764. 
58 Id. at 765. 
59 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. 
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regulate child pornography as compared to how they regulate porno-
60graphic material featuring adults.  
B. Child Pornography Legislation: National Origins 
The prohibition of the display or distribution of obscene mate-
rial, especially the exposure of minors to such material, has long been 
61the subject of state and federal legislation.  However, in 1977, Con-
gress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act 
62to fill in the gaps of existing federal obscenity statutes.  The Act was 
designed to amend Title 18 of the United States Code, which made it 
illegal to produce materials, including “any film, photograph, negative, 
slide, book, or magazine” in which minors were engaged in sexually 
63explicit conduct.  The Act featured language that included the prohibi-
tion of sexual exploitation of children, as well as coercion or enticement 
64of a minor into prostitution.  
Congress believed that the existing federal legislation neglected 
to protect some of the most vulnerable minors within the United States 
and this oversight resulted in the sexual exploitation of those minors, 
resulting in those minors being forced into prostitution or child pornog-
65raphy.  The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report that accompanied the 
legislation noted that “federal authorities initiated pornography investi-
gations only if the case involved a large manufacturer or distributor or 
if the case involved a connection with organized crime. Thus, many of 
the sources of child pornography never came within the purview of fed-
66eral investigators.”  The report further stated that there was no federal 
legislation that expressly prohibited the manner in which children were 
exploited to produce child pornography and the need for such federal 
laws was underscored by the lack of state laws banning the use of chil-
67dren to create pornography.  
Ultimately, the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploita-
tion Act attempted to prevent the use of children in the production of 
pornographic materials in three major capacities: first, by criminalizing 
the creation of pornography portraying children in an obscene manner 
                                                
60 Id. at 756–58. 
61 Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 159 (1993). 
62 See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 9–10 (1977). 
63 Id. at 1. 
64 Id. at 2. 
65 Id. at 8–9. 
66 Id. at 9–10. 
67
 See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 10 (1977). 
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as a new category of child abuse; second, by expanding legislation pro-
hibiting the interstate trafficking of minors to include male minors; and 
third, by “go[ing] as far as constitutionally possible to ban the sale and 
68distribution of child pornography.”  Congress hoped that the passage 
of the Act would arm prosecutors with a more robust assortment of tools 
with which they could protect children and punish those who abuse 
them.69 
C. The State Follows Suit: The Development of Maryland’s Child 
Pornography Law 
In 1978, the Maryland General Assembly (General Assembly) 
enacted the state’s first law regulating child pornography; the law was 
part of the larger national trend of legislation aimed at fighting child 
70pornography production.  The Maryland law made it illegal to cause, 
force, or knowingly permit a minor under the age of 16 to be featured in 
71pornographic material.  Additionally, the law criminalized the act of 
either filming or photographing a minor who was engaged in obscene 
72activity.  In the bill file accompanying the statute, testimony from 
stakeholders such as members of the National Conference of State Leg-
islatures and State Attorney General’s Office explained that the purpose 
of the state law was to complement the federal child pornography statute 
and incarcerate predators involved in the production and distribution of 
73child pornography.  
Over the years, the General Assembly strengthened the child 
pornography statute—in 1985, the state legislature broadened the exist-
ing law to include a provision that made it illegal to “knowingly distrib-
ute, promote, or possess with intent to distribute materials” depicting a 
minor “engaged as a subject in sexual conduct,” conduct that may or 
may not qualify as “ 74obscene.”  The legislature amended the Maryland 
child pornography statute again in 1986 to include a prohibition on pho-
tographing minors under 16 years of age who were engaged in sexual 
                                                
68 Id. at 18. 
69 Id. 
70 See Leighton Aiken, The Legal Ramifications of Child Pornography in Maryland, 10 U. 
BALT. L. FORUM. 27, 28 (1980); see also MD. CODE. ANN. art. 27, § 419A (1978) (current version 
at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207 (2019)). 
71 See art. 27, § 419A (current version at CRIM. LAW § 11-207). 
72 See id. 
73 See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 461 (2005). 
74 Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 164 (1993). 
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75activity.  The General Assembly increased the age of who qualified as 
a “ 76minor” to 18 in 1989.  The legislature expanded the list of what 
could qualify as a prohibited “item” containing child pornography in 
1995, where the statute was revised to include “film” and “computer 
77disc,”  and later, in 2006, to include “ 78video games.”  
In 2019, the General Assembly passed a law that amended the 
definition of “sexual conduct”  to include “lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person” and expanded what qualified as 
child pornography possession, making possession of computer-gener-
ated images of minors under the age of sixteen “that are indistinguisha-
79ble from an actual child” illegal.  The intention behind these expan-
sions and revisions was clear—by broadening the legal definition of 
“minor” and “sexual conduct”, as well as types of conduct criminalized 
by the child pornography statute, the General Assembly was attempting 
to make it easier for prosecutors to put predators who were engaged in 
80the production and distribution of child pornography in prison.  
However, Maryland’s child pornography law contains no excep-
tion for minors who produce and distribute material featuring minors 
81engaged in sexual activity.  In 2019, Delegate C.T. Wilson introduced 
legislation in response to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ’opin-
ion on S.K.’ 82s case.  In his testimony before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Delegate Wilson stated that while minors engaged in sexting 
could be described as involved in “voluntary self-exploitation,” those 
minors have brains that are still developing, with “prefrontal cortexes 
that are definitely not evolved to the point where they understand prob-
lem-solving, impulse control, weighing options…”, and it is unjust to 
                                                
75 See 1986 Md. Laws 602. 
76 1989 Md. Laws 2797. 
77 1989 Md. Laws 1798. 
78 2006 Md. Laws 1822. 
79 H.B.1027, 2019 Leg., 440th Sess. (Md. 2019). 





93ff74bdaa4c%26playfrom%3D4424000 (explaining that the purpose of H.B. 1027 was to 
“strengthen current child porn laws by elevating them to the federal standard,” thus empowering 
state law enforcement “to go after those who might otherwise slip through the cracks”). 
81 In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 57 (2019) (stating that the plain meaning of the Maryland 
child pornography statute does not distinguish between whether an adult or a minor is 
distributing the material at issue). 
82 Id. at 57–58 n. 24. 
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83subject those minors to the same harsh punishments as adults.  While 
Delegate Wilson’s bill did not pass during the 2019 legislative session, 
Delegate Wilson and several of his fellow legislators proposed new bills 
during the 2020 legislative session that would exempt minors from the 
84child pornography statute, under specific conditions.  Despite the leg-
islators’ efforts, none of the bills were made into law.85  
D. Cellphones and Generation Z: The Complicating Factor of 
Sexting Among Minors 
After the first child pornography laws were passed at the federal 
level, as well as the state level in Maryland, a staggering number of 
technological advances have taken place. But perhaps the most dramatic 
shift of all has been to the ubiquitous use of cellphones by virtually 
86every millennial and member of Generation Z.  According to a  2019 
report from the Pew Research Center, smartphone ownership is up by 
81% from the first time Pew conducted a smartphone ownership survey 
87in 2011.  The report further noted that smartphone dependency has 
grown over time, with 1 in 5 Americans now living as “smartphone-
only” internet users, using their smartphones as their exclusive means 
88of accessing the internet at home.  Finally, a 2018 Pew survey measur-
ing teen internet use found that an increasing number of teens use the 
internet “on a near-constant basis” with “45% of teens say[ing] they use 
                                                






84 See H.B. 1049, Md. Gen. Assembly, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legisla-
tion/Details/HB1049?ys=2019rs (last visited Apr. 17, 2020); see H.B. 931, 2020 Leg., 441st 
Sess. (Md. 2020); see H.B. 501, 2020 Leg. 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); see H.B. 1245, 2020 Leg., 
441st Sess. (Md. 2020). 
85 See id. 
86 See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/; see also Defining Generations: 
Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, Pᴇᴡ Rᴇs. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-
begins/ (defining “millennial” as the cohort of individuals born between 1981 and 1996 and 
“Generation Z” as the cohort of individuals born between 1997 and 2012). 
87 Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 86. 
88 Id. 
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the internet ‘almost constantly, ’a figure that has nearly doubled from 
89the 24% who said this in the 2014-2015 survey.”  
The exponential increase in cellphone use has had profound im-
plications on the way young Americans communicate, especially Gen-
eration Z (“Gen Z”), the cohort of Americans born after 1996 (which 
includes S.K., K.S., and A.T.). Gen Z strongly prefers to text rather than 
call, and accordingly, use the texting app on their phones as their pri-
90mary means of communicating with others.  The constant connection 
offered by texting exposes Gen Z to instant gratification, as well as im-
mediate frustration if someone responds ambiguously or there is no re-
91sponse.  Members of the Gen Z cohort have mixed feelings about tex-
ting, with some teens stating that while texting can be an easier mode of 
communication for those who are shy, “one issue is that translating tone 
of voice through text is difficult (sarcasm, empathy, etc.) . . .. [i]t is im-
personal, and people can’ 92t tell or read your emotions.”  
Complicating the already mixed effects of smartphone use 
among the Gen Z cohort is the rise of sexting as a type of digital com-
munication. Sexting has increased on a large scale in recent years, and 
93the practice increases in prevalence as a young person ages.  Today, 1 
94in 4 teens have received a sext, and 1 in 7 teens have sent a sext.  Stud-
ies have linked the increasing pervasiveness of sexting to the ubiqui-
tousness of smartphone use, which is underscored by findings that rates 
of sexts sent and received via smartphone are much higher than those 
95sent and received via computer.  As the rise of sexting is relatively re-
cent, the impact of the practice on youth has just started to be studied in 
96the past decade.  However, sexting may lead to emotional distress for 
those pressured into sending photos, as well as for those who receive 
photos (especially if the recipient did not consent to have the photos sent 
                                                
89 Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, Pᴇᴡ Rᴇs. 
CTR. (May 31, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/9/2018/05/PI_2018.05.31_TeensTech_FINAL.pdf. 
90 See Daniel Wayne Long, Exploring Generational Differences in Text Messaging 
Usage and Habits (Oct. 12, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Nova Southeastern 
University) (on file with NSUWorks, College of Engineering and Computing). 
91 Id. at 106. 
92 Id. at 107–108. 
93 Sheri Madigan, et. al, Prevalence of Multiple Forms of Sexting 
Behavior Among Youth: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 327, 
328 (2018). 
94 Id. at 332. 
95 Id. 
96 See Long, supra note 90. 
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97to them).  Additionally, if sexts are circulated widely throughout a 
school, or on the internet, there can be serious mental health repercus-
98sions for those involved.  
E. When Technology Outpaces the Law: States Attempt to 
Reconcile Child Pornography Legislation with Teen Sexting 
One of the most problematic aspects of the rise of sexting among 
Gen Z is the inconsistent manner in which different courts respond to 
99the practice.  At the federal level, any sexually suggestive image fea-
turing a minor qualifies as child pornography, and the government can 
prosecute someone for the production, distribution, and possession of 
100such images, without any exemptions for minors or sexting.  How-
ever, states vary widely in how they treat sexting within the context of 
their child pornography laws: only 20 states specifically address sending 
sexts to a minor or receiving sexts from a minor, and those states have 
vast differences on whether they consider sexting involving minors to 
be a strict liability crime, whether sexting involving minors requires pu-
nitive action, whether a resulting conviction should be a violation, mis-
demeanor, or felony, and how to treat sexts that are being sent and re-
101ceived exclusively by minors.  
The law’s sluggish and incoherent response to the advent of sex-
ting has produced a great deal of harm, especially to minors like S.K., 
who are criminalized for violating child pornography laws, due to their 
102participation in the increasingly common practice of sexting.  Slowly, 
prosecutors are realizing that minors engaging in sexting should not be 
103punished under child pornography laws.  William Fitzpatrick, former 
president of the National District Attorneys Association, and the district 
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KAUFMAN   
124 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 20:1 
attorney of Onondaga County in New York, urged his fellow district 
attorneys to be extremely careful when handling teen sexting cases, and 
to favor less severe punishments as opposed to criminal charges when-
104ever possible.  Mr. Fitzpatrick, as well as many legal scholars, have 
tried to lobby state legislatures to pass laws that are a better fit for the 
105current technological landscape.  While some states have passed laws 
106in an attempt to remedy this issue, Maryland is not one of them.  
Legal scholars have offered a variety of different solutions in 
recent years, including proposing model amendments to child pornog-
raphy laws that carve out protections for minors who sext other minors 
of their own volition, while still prosecuting adults who attempt to ob-
107tain explicit material from minors.  However, other scholars have crit-
icized these amendments as oversimplifying the complexity of sexting, 
as the amendments do not address other issues, such as the convergence 
of sexting and revenge porn, or when minors upload sexts to websites 
108that display child pornography.  Ultimately, many prosecutors and 
scholars have reached the same understanding: adjudicating minors as 
delinquent under child pornography laws for sexting each other is harm-
ful in a variety of ways; and more nuanced laws, offering specific rem-
edies tailored to prevent the harm caused by child pornography, revenge 
porn, coerced sexting, and receiving non-consensual sexts must be 
109passed as soon as possible.  
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
The Court of Appeals determined whether the intermediate ap-
pellate court erred in finding S.K. to be involved in the offense of dis-
tributing child pornography as articulated by CR § 11-207(a)(4) and 
whether the court erred in finding S.K. involved in offense of displaying 
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110an obscene item to a minor as outlined by CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii).  In a 
6-1 decision, the Court held that the text of Maryland’s child pornogra-
phy statute was unambiguous and contained no exemption for minors, 
and thus, S.K. qualified as one who knowingly distributed child pornog-
111raphy under CR § 11-207(a)(4).  Judge Joseph M. Getty, writing for 
the majority, further held that the type of digital media S.K. sent to her 
friends—a text-messaged video—qualified as a “film” under the statute 
and therefore, S.K.’s conduct fell within the purview of the CR § 11-
112203(b)(1).  
In explaining its holding, the Maryland Court of Appeals high-
lighted three sources that bolstered their decision: the conclusions other 
state courts have reached after adjudicating cases similar to S.K.’s, the 
plain language of Maryland’s child pornography laws, and the type of 
conduct covered by Maryland’s child pornography laws.113 The Court 
114began with an overview of State v. Gray,  a decision out of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court where the majority upheld the conviction of a 
115seventeen-year-old boy for sexting an adult woman.  The Gray court 
declared that the language of Washington statute at issue was unambig-
uous: “[a] person commits the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the second degree when he or 
she . . . [k]nowingly . . . disseminate[s] . . . any visual or printed matter 
that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct 
116. . .”  
The Gray court declined to make an exception for minors, hold-
117ing that the scope of the statute was clear.  While the Gray court 
acknowledged the policy issues surrounding the prosecution of minors 
for consensually sexting explicit images, and that there was a break-
down between state law and rapidly changing technological innova-
tions, the court stated:“ our duty is to interpret the law as written and, if 
118ambiguous, apply its plain meaning to the facts before us.”  In its dis-
cussion of State v. Gray, the Court of Appeals noted that after the Wash-
ington Supreme Court decided the case, the Washington Legislature 
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subsequently amended the state’s child pornography statute to address 
119the issues presented by consensual sexting among minors.  
The Court of Appeals also referenced a recent decision out of 
120the Colorado Supreme Court, People in Interest of T.B.,  in which the 
court upheld the conviction of a minor, who had been sexting two other 
121minors.  The male teenager facing charges, T.B., had been arrested on 
an unrelated charge for sexual assault, and the arresting officers discov-
ered explicit images on the teenager’ 122s cellphone.  The state filed 
charges against T.B. on two counts of sexual exploitation of a child un-
der Colorado law, Section 18-6-403(3)(b.5), C.R.S., as well as charges 
123related to the alleged sexual assault.  As the Washington Supreme 
Court had decided in State v. Gray, the Colorado Supreme Court held 
that the plain language of the applicable statute was unambiguous and 
declined to create an exception for minors facing charges for violating 
the statute, stating that “nothing . . . suggests that such harms are less-
ened or do not exist merely because the sexually exploitative material is 
124made, possessed, or distributed by a juvenile rather than an adult.”  
After discussing the outcome of People in Interest of T.B., the Court of 
Appeals noted that the Colorado General Assembly had passed a new 
law addressing sexting among minors, creating the civil offense of “ex-
125change of a private image by a juvenile”.  Minor offenders would be 
subject to either a $50 fine or mandatory participation in education pro-
126grams addressing the risks of sexting.  Following their exploration of 
the outcomes of both State v. Gray and People in Interest of T.B., the 
Court of Appeals emphasized that the General Assembly had not up-
dated the state’s child pornography statute to address the issues pre-
sented by minors engaged in consensual sexting, but acknowledged that 
a bill had been introduced in the 2019 legislative session to decriminal-
127ize the production or distribution of child pornography by a minor.  
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The Court then turned to the plain language of Maryland’s child 
128pornography laws—specifically, the language of CR § 11-207(a)(4).  
Judge Getty noted that precedent instructed the Court to interpret the 
statute’s terminology using “popular understanding of the English lan-
129guage.”  To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, Judge Getty 
stated that precedent further directed the Court to discern whether there 
is “more than one reasonable interpretation” or whether “the words are 
clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambigu-
130ous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme.”  Finally, the Court 
noted when the majority finds a statute to be ambiguous, the statute’s 
meaning and purpose must be examined within the broader context of 
131legislative intent.  
With the foundation of their statutory analysis established, the 
Court delved into the amended child pornography statute, CR § 11-
207(a)(4)(i), which declares it illegal for a “person” to “knowingly pro-
mote, advertise, solicit, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute 
any matter, visual representation, or performance . . . that depicts a mi-
nor engaged as a subject in sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct 
132. . .”  While S.K. argued that the statute contained two areas of ambi-
guity—that the phrase “a minor engaged as a subject” should be inter-
preted to preclude minors able to legally consent to sexual conduct, and 
that the “person” who is being prosecuted cannot both be the perpetrator 
while being “a minor engaged as a subject” at the same time—the Court 
133disagreed.  Finding that the Court of Special Appeals ’definition of 
the term “subject” aligned with the ordinary usage of the word, the 
Court of Appeals rejected S.K.’s contention that the phrase “engaged as 
134a subject” necessarily meant being subjugated by someone else.  The 
Court of Appeals further found that the term “person” includes both 
adults and minors, and therefore, the purview of the child pornography 
135statute encompassed minors such as S.K.  
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The Court proceeded to bolster its holding by citing the legisla-
136tive history of the statute.  Finding that the General Assembly has re-
peatedly amended the child pornography law to expand the power of the 
state in furtherance of its interest in preventing the production and dis-
tribution of child pornography, the Court noted that the General Assem-
bly had consistently updated the statute without carving out any excep-
137tions for minors.  Accordingly, the Court held that the plain meaning 
of the statute, as well as the law’s legislative history, supported the con-
clusion that the statute criminalized the conduct of both minors and 
138adults.  Therefore, S.K. was not exempted from being adjudicated as 
139delinquent under CR § 11-207(a)(4)(i).  
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether S.K.’s conduct 
fell within the purview of CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii), which prohibits the 
140willing or knowing display of obscene items to a minor.   Specifically, 
the Court discussed whether the contents of S.K.’s sext could be classi-
141fied as obscene under Maryland law.  The Court also addressed 
whether S.K.’s text-messaged video, or sext, qualified as the type of ob-
scene “item” contemplated by the statute, which listed still pictures or 
photographs, books, pocket books, pamphlets, magazines, videodiscs, 
videotapes, video games, films or computer discs, and recorded tele-
142phone as prohibited items.  Ultimately, the Court decided that S.K.’s 
video qualified as obscene under the Miller test, as the video featured 
images that portrayed minors in a sexualized manner, engaged in sexual 
143conduct.  
In addition, the Court found that S.K.’s video was indeed an 
“item” as contemplated by the child pornography law because the video 
qualified as a “ 144film.”  In explaining their decision, the Court outlined 
the intent of the legislature as it pertained to the statute, citing numerous 
occasions where the Maryland General Assembly revised the statute to 
145prevent any potential loopholes for technological advances.  The 
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Court held that the emergence of new technology that allowed for digital 
communication did not prevent the statute from applying to those new 
146mediums through which obscene material is distributed.  The Court 
explained that the concept of “film” has evolved over the years from 
film played by movie projectors to videotapes to DVDs to digital files, 
147now played on a variety of devices.  As a result, the Court found that 
the term “film” was broad enough to include text-messaged videos 
148played on a smartphone.   Because “film” was an “item” listed as pro-
hibited by the applicable child pornography statute, and S.K.’s sext was 
included within the purview of that statute and therefore violating CR § 
11-203(b)(1).149 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Michele D. Hotten argued that 
S.K. did not distribute child pornography by sending a sext to her friends 
and did not commit the offense of displaying an obscene item to a mi-
150nor.  Judge Hotten began her dissent by arguing that it is not the func-
tion of CR § 11-207(a)(4) to prosecute sexual activity between consent-
151ing minors.  Rather, the purpose of the statute is to protect minors 
from predators, and therefore, it is illogical for a minor to be their own 
152predator or their own child pornographer.  To support her argument, 
Judge Hotten delved into the grammar of the statute, finding that the 
law’s use of colons would create redundancy if one were to read the law 
in a manner that made a “person” and a “ 153minor” the same individual.  
Additionally, Judge Hotten noted that the majority conceded that under 
the subsection (a)(1), the same individual cannot be the “minor” and the 
“person” at the same time, yet held that under subsections (a)(2)-(a)(5), 
no distinction between a “minor” and a “ 154person” was needed.  Judge 
Hotten argued that the majority’s analysis was inconsistent in its appli-
cation and therefore contrary to canons of statutory construction, 
“which dictate that one should avoid interpreting a provision in a man-
155ner that is inconsistent with the structure of the statute.”  
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Next, Judge Hotten examined the purpose of Maryland’s child 
pornography law, citing both Supreme Court case law as well as deci-
156sions out of the Court of Appeals.  After explaining that the purpose 
of the child pornography laws at both the federal and state level was to 
protect minors from sexual exploitation, Judge Hotten asserted that 
S.K.’s actions were completely different from the conduct contemplated 
157by the child pornography laws.  Judge Hotten noted that S.K. was al-
legedly participating in sexual conduct that was consensual in nature, as 
opposed to conduct in which she was being hurt or exploited—meaning 
that S.K.’s conduct was outside the scope of activity that child pornog-
158raphy laws are intended to prevent.  She emphasized this point by cit-
ing the dissent in State v. Gray, which stated that Washington’s child 
pornography statute was “specifically intended to protect children de-
picted in pornography,” and it was only logical for the children who are 
depicted to be exempted from prosecution, as the prosecutorial process 
159can cause further harm to those children.  
Finally, Judge Hotten disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that S.K.’s text-messaged video qualified as a “ 160film.”  Instead, Judge 
Hotten asserted that the term “film” does not refer to the contents of the 
medium, but rather, the medium itself: “a thin, flexible strip of plastic 
or other material coated with light-sensitive emulsion for exposure in a 
161camera, used to produce photographs or motion pictures.”  Judge Hot-
ten further stated that “if the General Assembly wanted to amend the 
language of CR § 11-203 to include digital files, it would have done so,” 
and concluded that the majority had erred in their decision to adjudicate 
162S.K. as delinquent under Maryland law.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
In re S.K  was incorrectly decided by the Court of Appeals be-
cause their holding failed to advance the legislative intent underlying 
163child pornography legislation at both the state and federal levels.  In 
addition, the Court was overly broad in characterizing a digital file as a 
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film and stretched the language of the statute beyond the bounds of legal 
permissibility to make S.K.’s conduct fit the law’ 164s purview.  Finally, 
the Court had the opportunity to reconcile technological realities with 
an antiquated statute but declined to do so, leading to an absurd legal 
165outcome that failed to promote justice.  
A. The Court Failed to Advance the Legislative Intent Underlying 
the Child Pornography Statute 
When Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sex-
ual Exploitation Act in 1977, the purpose of the law was clear: to shift 
previous efforts focused on combating the dissemination of obscenity in 
general towards more targeted legislation to combat the production and 
166distribution of child pornography.  The new law was passed with the 
goal of both eradicating child pornography, as well as preventing the 
recruitment and exploitation of vulnerable youth forced to work as child 
167prostitutes.  The Senate Report that accompanied the law noted that 
“child pornography and child prostitution have become highly orga-
nized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale” 
and that the “existing Federal laws dealing with prostitution and por-
nography do not protect against the use of children in these activi-
168ties….”  From the outset, it is clear that Congress’s intention behind 
the federal child pornography law was to prevent the exploitation of 
vulnerable youth through child pornography and child prostitution. As 
for Maryland’s child pornography laws, the bill file accompanying the 
first state child pornography laws demonstrates that the state statute was 
169passed to further the same goals of the federal law.  
In contrast, S.K., acting on her own volition, sent a video of her-
170self engaged in consensual sexual activity to her friends.  S.K.’s ac-
tions were not out of the ordinary; she was simply participating in a form 
of communication that has become increasingly common among her 
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171peers.  Legal scholars have noted that when sexted images are not ob-
tained through coercion, “the immediate psychological, physical, and 
emotional harm” to a child “that is the foundation of the child protection 
172rationale is decidedly absent.”  Furthermore, it is the production and 
distribution of obscene images of minors among adults, not among mi-
nors, that fuels exploitative child pornography and child prostitution in-
173dustries.  Given that S.K.’s conduct falls beyond the scope of activi-
ties the federal and state child pornography statutes were designed to 
prevent, the Court erred in deciding that S.K. had violated the state por-
nography statute. 
B. The Court Was Overly Broad in Characterizing a Text 
Message Video as a “Film” 
Over the years, the General Assembly has amended the state’s 
child pornography legislation, attempting to remain in stride with rap-
174idly evolving technology.  The last time the legislature updated the 
statute was in 2006, when “video games” were added to the list of media 
175covered by CR § 11-203.  When the Court heard S.K.’s case, the stat-
ute included the following media as qualifying “items”: still pictures or 
photographs, books, pocket books, pamphlets, magazines, videodiscs, 
videotapes, video games, films, computer discs, or recorded telephone 
176messages.  While the Court held that the child pornography statute’s 
inclusion of “film” makes the law broad enough to encompass a cell-
phone video as a type of covered media, there is no language within the 
177statute to support that decision.  On the contrary, the legislature listed 
very specific types of media in the statute, none of which include digital 
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178files, text messages, or cellphone videos.  Rather than acknowledge 
that the plain language of the child pornography law did not encompass 
the type of digital media that S.K. sent to her friends, the Court departed 
from the statutory language and used an overly broad interpretation of 
the word “film” to convict S.K. 
In addition to finding no support within the plain language of 
CR § 11-203, the Court’s holding is at odds with the recent legislative 
history of Maryland’s child pornography laws. After the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals ’issued their decision regarding S.K.’s case, Delegate 
Kathleen M. Dumais introduced House Bill 97 (which was cross-filed 
with Senate Bill 1003, sponsored by Senator Susan C. Lee) to revise the 
list of “items” in CR § 11-203 to include video files, video images, and 
179video recordings.  Delegate Dumais’s bill passed in the House, but 
both the House and Senate bill failed to pass in the Senate’s Judicial 
180Proceeding Committee.  The General Assembly had the opportunity 
to update the statute to reflect the type of media S.K. used when sending 
a sext to her friends, but declined to make any amendments in accord-
181ance with technological advances.  By including cellphone videos 
within the purview of CR § 11-203, the Court acted in a legislative ca-
pacity, rather than fulfilling the judicial obligation of interpreting exist-
ing law. 
C. The Court Neglected to Reconcile Technological Realities with 
the Antiquated Statute 
Throughout the majority opinion in In re S.K., there are ac-
knowledgments of the major disconnect between the technological re-
182alities of modern communication and Maryland law.  The majority 
notes that “[u]nlike the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation 
X, or Millennials, Generation Z has never known life without access to 
a smartphone” and that is”[c]onsistent with the rise in smartphone us-
age, at least 18.5% of middle and high schoolers report having received 
sexually explicit images or videos on their phones or computers,” con-
183cluding that the trend that will likely continue to increase over time.  
The majority further states that “S.K., albeit unwisely, engaged in the 
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same behavior as many of her peers” and that “there may be compelling 
policy reasons for treating teenage sexting different from child pornog-
184raphy.”  Rather than make a decision that comports with those com-
pelling policy reasons, the Court simply suggests that legislation to ad-
dress this glaring legal oversight should be passed by the state legisla-
185ture at some point in the future.  
However, by failing to meaningfully address the technological 
realities of cell phone use among minors, the Court missed an oppor-
tunity to reconcile modern communication trends with the out-of-date 
child pornography law through a First Amendment analysis. The Court 
had the chance to use the framework of free speech to examine whether 
or not consensual sexting among minors qualifies as child pornography, 
yet declined to apply this lens to S.K.’s case. The First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law 
186. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  However, over time, the Su-
preme Court has clarified which content is worthy of First Amendment 
187protection and which is not—in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , the 
Supreme Court stated that content or speech that is so lacking in value 
that “any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality” is beyond constitutional 
188protection.  Child pornography has since been declared unprotected 
189speech by the Supreme Court.  
But two questions remain - does sexting qualify as child pornog-
raphy? If not, is sexting worthy of First Amendment protection? There 
is certainly a compelling argument that sexting does not comport with 
the federal definition of child pornography, as articulated by the Su-
190preme Court in New York v. Ferber.  In Ferber, the Supreme Court 
focused on the harm caused by child pornography in their decision, stat-
ing that the production of the obscene material resulted in a “permanent 
record” of the abuse, as well as an “economic motive” to continue to 
191produce the pornography.  In the context of sexting—specifically, 
when a minor voluntarily sends a sext to another minor, the rationale 
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behind categorizing the material as unworthy of First Amendment pro-
192tection falls away.  There is no sexual abuse taking place, and there is 
no economic motive present (unless the minor recipient attempts to sell 
the explicit material, which did not occur in S.K.’ 193s case).  While there 
may be emotional and psychological harm when a minor sexts another 
minor, this is far from the abuse and economic incentive that results 
from the production and dissemination of child pornography.194 As a 
result, the constitutional support for outlawing child pornography does 
not easily encompass the prosecution of minors for voluntarily sexting 
each other.195 In neglecting to examine the technological reality of sex-
ting from a constitutional standpoint, the Court of Appeals failed to rec-
oncile the First Amendment issues presented by equating sexting with 
child pornography.196 
V. CONCLUSION 
In their recent decision, In re S.K., the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that S.K., a minor who texted her friends a video in which 
she was filmed engaging in a consensual sex act, had violated Maryland 
laws prohibiting the distribution of child pornography, as well as the 
197display of obscene materials to minors.  The Court incorrectly decided 
this case because their holding failed to comport with the legislative in-
198tent underlying the Maryland child pornography statute.  In addition, 
the Court’s characterization of S.K.’s text-messaged video as a “film” 
199in the context of the child pornography statute was overly broad.  Fur-
thermore, the Court’s analysis neglected to use a constitutional frame-
work to examine the technological realities of cellphone use in the mod-
ern world—specifically, the common practice of sexting among Gener-
200ation Z.  As a result, S.K. was punished by the very law designed to 
protect minors like her, which is a chilling outcome that must not be 
mistaken for justice. 
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